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61 Introduction
The importance of public participation for effective
policymaking is now widely endorsed. Public
participation (or at least its advocacy) is considered
essential to poverty reduction, social change in poor
countries, city politics and local governance,
development, building educational institutions and,
importantly for this article, technological change and
science-based innovation. Actors, institutions and
organisations who agree on very little else at least
do seem to agree about the centrality of engaging
with and mobilising the public in support of better
policies (even if they often fall out over the actual
practice of participation).
In science and technology policy circles, the Danish
model of ‘consensus conferences’ has been widely
borrowed and, even more widely, discussed (e.g. Blok
2007). Dutch approaches to national debate and
consensus formation (e.g. around energy policy) no
longer appear quite so unique in the European
context as they did in the 1980s. The UK has moved
from its previous reliance on expert committees to
some experimentation with public debate and
engagement (notably, in the context of genetically
modified foods but increasingly also in the area of
nanotechnology) (Stilgoe et al. 2006). The European
Commission has adopted a ‘Science and Society
action plan’ (CEC 2002) in which issues of public
support and engagement are given substantial
prominence.
On the one hand, issues of science and technology
policy (particularly genetic modification, stem cells
and nanotechnology) have become central to
political and institutional action, especially within
Europe. Indeed, it could be argued that such matters
have become a defining feature of the whole
European project (as reflected for example in the
2000 Lisbon agenda aimed at making the European
Union (EU) ‘the most dynamic and competitive
knowledge-based economy in the world’). On the
other hand, there is a growing acceptance (fuelled
partly by experience of previous controversies) that
such matters cannot be tackled without public
engagement and support (or at least legitimation
and acceptance). In this situation, it is perhaps
tempting to talk of a new ‘European’ paradigm for
scientific governance in which science and society
work together and innovative forms of social
partnership are being created. In this article, drawing
on the results of the STAGE project (Science,
Technology and Governance in Europe), we will
specifically examine the evidence for such a new
European governance style.1
As an EU-funded thematic network, STAGE drew
upon collaboration between researchers across
Western Europe in 2001–5. It did not set out to
‘sample’ European experience systematically but
rather to explore a range of accessible and
potentially interesting examples of ‘European’
scientific governance in action. It was based on
26 case studies and country syntheses across eight
European nations, as illustrated in Table 1 (full
information and access to all the case studies is
available at: www.stage-research.net). Our cases
suggest a diversity of European governance practices
– but also certain thematic links and common
debates (Hagendijk and Irwin 2006). As we will
show, signs of convergence can be identified,
particularly around a widespread interest (at least on
the rhetorical level) in deliberative forms of
governance, but there continues to be a wide
diversity of approaches and configurations.
In drawing attention to signs of convergence and a
trend towards endorsing participation, it is also
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important to maintain a critical perspective on the
kinds of change that have taken place. As a number
of colleagues within the STAGE network have
observed, there is indeed a danger that this shift is
taking place largely at the level of rhetoric – of ‘talk
about talk’ (Hagendijk 2004; Horst 2003; Irwin
2001). Equally, in an entity of the scale, complexity
and diversity of the EU, it is unlikely that any pattern
of change will be uniform or one-directional
(Jasanoff 2005). As previous research in the EU has
suggested (Rothstein et al. 1999), standardisation and
diversity often accompany one another so that
attempts to impose a common European pattern
can actually accentuate matters of local identity and
difference.
This article then focuses on specifically European
treatments of public engagement with science and
technology. However, there are strong thematic and
practical concerns that are common to many
international contexts, both within and outside
Europe. Thus, a shared concern has been expressed
as to whether public mobilisation is just another
form of political marketing or a genuine attempt to
introduce ‘deeper’ forms of democracy: is it
legitimation or engagement, frothy rhetoric or
paradigm shift? Our argument in this article is that
such questions cannot be answered in general, but
only with particular regard to particular cases and
contexts. This approach is broadly in line with John
Gaventa’s view that democracy-building is an
ongoing process of struggle and contestation, rather
than the adoption of a standard recipe or
institutional blueprint (Gaventa 2006).
The question of whether there is a European model
of scientific governance and whether this can be of
use to policymaking in other parts of the world
unavoidably also touches upon well-entrenched
distinctions between the ‘North’ and the ‘South’,
between centre and periphery and between
‘developed’ and ‘underdeveloped’ countries. As Payne
(2005) and others have argued, such distinctions
have always been simplifications. The emergence of
India, China and Brazil and other countries and
regions as new ‘knowledge economies’ in a
globalising world, have made such categorical
distinctions even more problematic. Rich countries
and regions like the USA and the EU are themselves
in transformation and feel themselves under
competitive threat. Development is now
everywhere, as the editorial in the first issue of the
journal Progress in Development Studies commented.
In our view, this (admittedly partial) deconstruction
of older categories makes the potential lessons that
can be drawn from the European experience for
public engagement in other parts of the world even
more interesting and relevant. How should we
conceptualise ‘European’ experience – especially
given its inherent heterogeneity and diversity but
also cross-fertilisation and shifting boundaries? What
resonances, implications and reflections does this
suggest with regard to science and democracy in
other parts of the world?
Our general argument in what follows is not that a
new paradigm of engagement has swept across
Europe, pushing aside the old emphasis on
innovation and economic competition. Although
interesting social experiments in engagement have
taken place, it is not plausible to suggest that these
have replaced more familiar modes of governance
and institutional action. In any case, significant
debate still surrounds the form and effectiveness of
such experiments.
What we do argue instead is that Western Europe
represents a particularly important site for the study
of scientific governance. As the following typology
of governance will convey, it is oversimplistic to
portray European scientific governance as caught in a
battle between two models of governance (e.g. the
neoclassical vs. the deliberative). Instead, we present
a situation where a number of governance modes
are in loose (often implicit and unacknowledged)
coexistence and (sometimes) competition. What
makes Europe noteworthy in a global context, is an
emergent European culture of scientific governance
in which new issues of ‘science, society and
innovation’ have become mainstream. In this article,
we explore the contemporary scientific and
governance culture in Europe and look for lessons to
draw for analysis and action. In so doing, our working
hypothesis is that the European experience – while
not directly applicable elsewhere – does represent a
significant testing ground for notions of science,
governance and democracy. As Gaventa (2006: 22)
expressed: ‘Taking a constructionist approach to
democracy means that strategies for deepening
democracy will look differently in different places,
but at the same time we need more systematic
knowledge … of what the promising strategies
might be across a much wider range of political and
social conditions’.
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2 A typology of governance
After preliminary discussions in the STAGE project
(Elam and Bertilsson 2003) we considered it
important to move beyond simple bi-modal
presentations of governance styles. Too much
discussion about public and deliberative engagement
with science and technology has taken the form of
either/or presentation: typically, either an emphasis
on innovation and competition or a concern with
democracy and engagement (alternatively, either
public engagement is a serious endeavour or it is a
legitimatory sham). Furthermore, early explorations
of the cases and the national contexts demonstrated
that it would not be feasible (or productive) to typify
national polities in a fixed classification scheme. Such
classifications tend to present national contexts as a
rigid backdrop against which individual cases play out.
Instead, a process-oriented taxonomy was developed
through which different forms of governance and
forms of public engagement could be characterised
and related to one another (Hagendijk and
Kallerud 2003).
One important aspect of this typology is to allow
comparisons of the roles assigned to ‘public’ groups
in various instances and cases of public engagement.
Is ‘the public’ being constructed as active or passive;
as consumers or as citizens; as homogeneous and
stable or as fractured and dynamic? Each mode
posited in the typology ‘performs’ the relationship
between scientific/technological innovation and
wider society in a distinctive manner. Yet, no country
is assumed to fit straightforwardly into any single
category and all actually combine a mix of these
elements in addressing specific situations (Horst
2005). Equally, the categories are not intended to be
watertight. Considerable overlaps can be identified,
for example, between the corporatist and
deliberative (or educational and market) approaches.
The heuristic typology was employed to analyse
similarities and differences in various national
developments within Europe (see Hagendijk et al.
2005). The following is a brief integrated summary
of the typology and the findings:
z Discretionary. In discretionary governance,
policymaking takes place with virtually no explicit
interaction with ‘the public’. On a general level,
science governance in Portugal and Greece can
be seen to exemplify this discretionary mode in
the sense that governance is presented primarily
as a matter for government. Government is
portrayed as serving universal goals of progress,
welfare and growth. Equally, the public interest is
considered easy to define and enact. Within this
mode, there is no sustained effort to incorporate
the views of various publics in policy processes, let
alone to develop a culture of scientific citizenship.
z Corporatist. Within corporatist governance,
differences of interest between stakeholders are
recognised as inputs to processes of negotiation
in which workable compromises are sought. The
processes of negotiation take place within a
closed or highly regulated space, so the decisive
feature is the question of admission and
recognition of legitimate stakeholders. Generally,
the Scandinavian countries can be taken to
exemplify this mode of governance. In Sweden,
the creation of a knowledge society as a
necessary prerequisite for a well-functioning
national innovation system has been seen as a
commonly shared goal. Norway and Denmark
have developed an inclusive corporatist mode of
governance where various oppositional voices are
sought to be included as stakeholders in the
processes of negotiation.
z Educational. Educational modes of governance
assume that conflicts or tensions regarding
science and technology policy are founded on a
lack of knowledge on the part of the public.
Hence it is necessary to educate the public
through dissemination of scientific (expert)
knowledge in order to create an informed public
of scientific citizens that understand the experts’
assessment of the problems and possibilities of
science. A notable example of this educational
mode has been the effort to create a pervasive
scientific culture in Portugal through a national
agency. The efforts in Finland and Sweden to
increase the public understanding of science as a
necessary component of building a knowledge
society can also be seen as exemplifying this
educational mode of governance.
z Market. Market governance is based on the
notion that science and technology can be
governed through the economic mechanisms of
demand and supply. In this mode, the public
participates as customers and consumers in a
market when they make decisions about
purchasing a product. Compared with countries
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outside the EU (notably the USA), European
traditions of governance may be less explicitly
market oriented (although science and technology
policy discussion in the UK about the need for
‘confident consumers’ fits this model well).
However, there are signs that economic
liberalisation and deregulation are increasingly
leading to a market mode of governance (as for
example, in Finland). This is exemplified also by the
persistent suggestion that GMO labelling is the
best means of letting consumers choose for
themselves rather than relying on complex
regulatory structures.
z Agonistic. Agonistic governance takes place under
conditions of confrontation and adversity, when
decisions have to be made in a political context
where positions are strongly opposed. The
political democracies of Europe are not primarily
characterised by agonistic forms of governance. It
seems, however, that certain policy processes
regarding science and technology evolve in ways
which can lead to a form of agonistic stalemate.
Governance of nuclear waste in the UK, for
instance, is an example where policy decisions are
being made (or attempted) in the face of heated
public opposition. Agonistic processes suggest a
loss of control by the state as a variety of
stakeholders struggle for authority and influence.
z Deliberative. Deliberative governance rests on
the ideal that governance of science can be based
on strong public support deriving from a
continuous public debate of, and engagement
with, science. In this mode, members of the
public do not partake as consumers of science,
but as scientific citizens who take on the
perspective of the common good. This concept of
public deliberation cannot be seen as a complete
description of policy formation in any of the
European countries. Nevertheless, it seems to be
an ideal, which – as we have already noted – is
rather important in the constitution of science
governance, and various participatory exercises
have been moulded around this aspiration. In
particular, the consensus conferences organised by
the Danish Board of Technology have been
influential in this context.
As this brief presentation of the STAGE-typology
and its application in our project suggests, scientific
governance in Europe cannot be interpreted as a
simple pattern of convergence or a linear, uni-
directional development. The case studies within
STAGE demonstrate that none of the examined
European countries can be characterised by only one
of these modes of governance. Rather, each country
can best be described as a unique mix of several of
these modes. For example, the UK manifests just
about every mode – although corporatism has largely
been out of fashion there since the 1970s.
Furthermore, it seems that the different national
styles of governance are not stable, but rather in
periodic transition (Sweden may be moving forcefully
towards an educational mode, see Elam and Glimell
2004). Although there seem to be patterns of
mutual influence, it is clear that different countries
follow different trajectories, individually shaped by
local, national cultures.
Our wider argument is that it is specifically this
coexistence of modes that represents the European
framework (or style) of scientific governance. As this
article will go on to discuss, the juxtaposition and
‘churning’ of modes offers a unique opportunity to
consider the future possibilities for scientific
governance. In that sense, Europe represents a
distinctive social and institutional laboratory. We are
not therefore offering a unitary paradigm of scientific
governance in Europe but instead a more complex –
and internationally distinctive – pattern of diversity,
coexistence and contradiction/complementarity. It
follows that merely criticising individual nations for
being ‘insufficiently’ committed to one mode or
another (e.g. for failing to live up to deliberative ideals)
may be of limited intellectual and practical benefit.
Rather, there is a general need for greater analytical
clarity – and policy reflection with respect to the
ways in which (and when) modes of governance are
combined. The current political tendency is to make
separate ‘modal appeals’ simultaneously: as when
institutional rhetoric (e.g. in government reports and
major political speeches) shifts – at times, very
abruptly – between public engagement and greater
international competitiveness without pausing to
consider their possible connection or tension
(Irwin 2006).
The STAGE-typology should therefore not be seen
as a meta-framework for judging (or comparing)
national styles of science governance in order to
assess whether they comply with a single European
paradigm. Instead, the typology is employed as a
heuristic model, which makes it possible to expand
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the understanding of the various patterns of
convergence and divergence across Europe. It is also
important to stress that the allocation of each
governance case study to a particular mode is likely
to be contested (one commentator’s ‘deliberative’
mode may appear ‘educational’ to another). The
point should be made too that different modes may
be rather less distinctive in practice than they appear
to be in principle. Thus, the deliberative case for
‘broadening the stakeholders’ can develop into an
extension of older corporatist principles. These are
fluid judgements, open to contestation. This
suggestion is strongly supported by our empirical
findings.
Based on current political and academic discussions,
one of these modes was particularly important for
the STAGE network – deliberative governance. As
Elam and Bertilsson (2003) have argued, this mode
has been the focus for theoretical and academic
debates and has also received notable attention and
high priority on various political agendas. In the
remainder of this article, we will focus especially on
processes of deliberation and engagement in relation
to studies carried out in the STAGE project.
Certainly, the existence of a European rhetoric about
‘science and society engagement’ is an important
phenomenon which has an effect in itself. What
lessons can be drawn from our case studies for the
conduct of future engagement initiatives?
3 The deliberative mode in European practice
In all the countries studied within our project,
scientific governance has been on the agenda as an
increasingly important aspect of policymaking.
Furthermore, ideals about public participation have
surfaced in all countries, although there are significant
differences in the extent to which such ideals have
actually been implemented, as well as in the
interpretation of what engagement actually means in
a specific context. Three examples of scientific
governance may help to explore how the STAGE
cases relate in different ways to ideals of deliberation.
The first is the Danish consensus conference on the
development of electronic patient records. Here a
panel of 15 citizens was asked to review and question
expert knowledge with the aim of formulating a
consensus statement, which was later presented to
the parliament as a policy recommendation. The
Danish consensus conferences are organised by the
independent Danish Board of Technology and the
citizens chosen have expressed interest in, but have
no professional expertise and are not economically
involved in, the issue at stake. As Jensen’s (2004)
case study demonstrates, the consensus conference
can be seen as an effort to give voice to citizens in
policy formulation as well as to mediate between
citizens and experts in order to let citizen
experiences feed into the development of the
technology. There is, however, no systematic
evidence for these aspirations being put into practice.
Our second case study concerns local protest based
on environmental concerns in Portugal. After
Portuguese authorities in 1998 decided on a small
village (Souselas with 3,000 inhabitants) as the site
for the co-incineration of hazardous waste in cement
kilns, a protest committee was formed by a number
of regional civil society organisations. Among other
activities, the committee organised a number of
citizen protests (including a local petition signed by
more than 50,000 people) and an ‘International
Forum on Co-incineration’ which included various
specialists and experts in the search for technological
alternatives. Despite the fact that there was no
change in the official risk assessment of the
technology and that the government displayed no
faith in any form of benefits from citizen deliberation
and participation, the agonistic protests did slow
down the process of introducing co-incineration and
after a change in government it was decided to
abandon that particular process altogether.
The third example is the British ‘GM Nation? Debate’,
which took place in the summer of 2003. After the
British BSE experience, the government experienced
a lack of public trust in science and the remedy was
seen to be greater accountability and public
participation in scientific governance. Therefore,
deliberative elements were introduced into decision-
making processes. The GM Nation? Debate was
government funded, but organised by an independent
steering committee. It was large scale with more
than 600 local, regional and national meetings and
resulted in a message of ‘not yet – if ever’ signalling a
general public unease with GM crops. The
government, however, treated the exercise as
insulated from routine decision-making, and did not
commit itself to incorporating any of the outcomes.
In the end, it opted for a ‘case by case’ approach
more in line with international World Trade
Organization (WTO) pressures than the outcomes of
the engagement exercise.
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The overall impression from all the case studies is that
countries such as The Netherlands, Denmark and the
UK have been relatively energetic in this regard, while
deliberation has been less influential as a governance
mode in Portugal, Greece and Finland. In this context,
it should be acknowledged that the need for public
engagement has in some cases originated within the
policy establishment – as in the case with GM debate
in UK and The Netherlands – or been articulated
within civil society – as was demonstrated in case
studies from Greece and Portugal. In order to move
beyond such generalisations, we will pay particular
attention in the following discussion of the various
forms of implementing the ideal of participation and
engagement to three issues: the purpose, the actual
conduct and the outcome of deliberative engagement.
3.1 The purpose of deliberative engagement
One important difference between the cases is the
question of whether public engagement is supposed
to be an end in itself or a means to a particular
outcome. The case studies demonstrate a rather
diverging picture in this respect. As an end in itself
public engagement seems to be introduced primarily
as a way of empowering participants and creating a
culture of scientific citizenship. As a means, it seems
that deliberative initiatives can be employed both to
extend corporativist efficiency (by resolving potential
conflicts through negotiation) and to learn about
consumer/citizen preferences in order to make
socially robust public policy. Often there seems to be
an expectation that engagement will lead to some
form of consensus around controversial science and
technology, but an overall conclusion from the cases
is that such an expectation does not seem to be
fulfilled anywhere. Engagement initiatives are by no
means a quick fix to change controversy and
contestation into consensus. In this context, a
number of points seem relevant.
First of all, it is important to consider the relationship
between engagement initiatives and the innovation
agenda. In some cases, notably in Sweden and
Finland, it seems that engagement with the public is
primarily suggested as means to support and sustain a
high rate of technical innovation (Häyrinen-Alestalo et
al. 2004; Elam and Glimell 2004). The mix of
corporatist and educational modes in these countries
apparently makes way for expectations that
engagement initiatives represent one among other
ways of educating the public. This is perceived as a
necessary precondition for the creation of a
knowledge society in which scientific research is easily
disseminated and absorbed by relevant groups of
actors in society at large. In other examples,
engagement initiatives are framed as a kind of
counter power to the innovation agenda. This is most
obvious in the case of Norway, where religious values
and a sceptical public seem to be incorporated as a
legitimate stakeholder in the inclusive corporativist
negotiations about the future regulation and
exploitation of technological possibilities (Kallerud
2004a,b). A kind of middle position is demonstrated
in the case of the Danish consensus conferences and
the high-profile British and Dutch GM debates, which
can be seen as exploring the limits of how far the
innovation agenda can be pushed.
Second, it is important to be aware of the framing
of scientific citizenship within the various
engagement initiatives (Horst 2007; Irwin 2001). This
is specifically true with regard to the role of scientific
information and the perceived need for education.
The Dutch nuclear energy debate is an example of a
framing in which the actual debate about values and
political choices was preceded by a phase in which
experts from various sides were charged to collect
and assess the scientific and technical evidence and
come up with several energy scenarios. Participants
were expected to let themselves be educated by
scientific knowledge in order to be permitted
entrance to the arena of discussion (Hagendijk and
Terpstra 2004). Although criticism of the deficit
model (e.g. Irwin 1995) has influenced later
participatory designs, the question of how to balance
and combine dissemination and discussion of
scientific knowledge is not an easy one. There is a
persisting tension regarding the question of
admittance to engagement processes, demonstrated
in the many procedures and arguments about who
the participants of engagement exercises ideally
should be. In what specific capacity do ‘lay’ people
add to the process: is it that they are seen to have
valuable knowledge that can add to the scientific
knowledge or is it because they are seen to be a
possible neutral judge between diverse knowledge
claims? In the latter case, the issue of education
becomes prominent as it seems that what is
perceived as a ‘neutral’ citizen is often a previously
‘unengaged’ citizen. In these cases ‘information’ is
regularly presented as the means to empower and
engage the citizen, but this raises the controversial
issue of how to choose and present the kind of
information that should perform this task.
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Third, there is an interesting issue about the locus of
consensus or ‘rationality’ in the engagement
exercises. The framing very often draws upon a
universal ‘we’ as the acting subject, yet it is very
unclear how this ‘we’ is defined and how it will
come into existence. In some of the large-scale
deliberative experiments – such as the British and
the Dutch GM debate – the ‘we’ is seen to be
synonymous with the general public (Hagendijk and
Egmond 2004; Healey 2004). In this case it seems
that representatives of the public are asked to
participate as citizens taking the perspective of the
common good and considering a particular aspect of
science as one, albeit a very controversial one,
among many policy areas. In other cases, the ‘we’
seems more restricted to the actual parties included
in the deliberative exercise. This is true of the Danish
model of consensus conferences, where a citizens’
panel is chosen to speak on its own behalf as citizens
that have been presented with various and
conflicting knowledge claims (Jensen 2004). In this
case, the creation of the ‘we’ is an outcome of the
search for consensus regarding a specific scientific or
technological field and it is therefore not necessarily
synonymous with a more general public will.
In close connection to these points, a fourth issue is
the need to consider the relationship between
participatory mechanisms and political ‘market
research’ (Irwin 2001). The cases imply that sometimes
participatory methods come to be seen as – or at least
criticised for being – a way of exercising consumer
choice. In this context, it is necessary to discuss the
difference between political consumers exercising
their rights to choose based on individual preferences,
and the ideal of deliberation by citizens committed to
the perspective of a common good based on rational
arguments. In the first form, the mode of
engagement can be quite individualistic and the ‘result’
of an engagement process reached by aggregating
individual preferences. In the second form, the mode
of engagement is necessarily more social and
interactive and any result can only be obtained through
a joint, interactive and mutual process. Since the
framing of the engagement will be shaped very
differently in these two modes, confusion between
them can cause considerable distress and distrust. If
people are expecting to engage as citizens in a
common discussion of the general development of
society and technology, but find that their possible
responses, by the framing of the exercise, are
restricted to a display of their personal preferences and
choice of, for instance, GMO products, they might get
disappointed and start to think that organisers of the
exercise are not really interested in deliberation. At the
same time, the perceived ‘value added’ by an
engagement initiative is very different in these modes.
In the first mode the outcomes of participatory
exercises might be of most value to politicians as a
kind of social intelligence on public preferences, which
might lead to more legitimate decisions (Horst 2003).
The ideal of deliberation, however, seems to suggest
additional outcomes in terms of citizen empowerment
as well as an increased level of integration between
science and society.
3.2 The conduct of deliberative engagement
It seems to be an overall lesson from various case
studies that claims about procedural (un)fairness,
accusations of manipulation/bias, as well as the
questioning of motives, represent an important and
integral part of debates over science governance. In
the UK, for instance, sections of industry denounced
the outcome of the GM Nation? public debate (GM
Nation? 2003) by stressing that the organisation of
the exercise had allowed too much space for
agonistic viewpoints from radical participants rather
than maintaining a more controlled deliberative
process (Healey 2004). Passing judgements on forms
of participation and governance is therefore a deeply
embedded and significant element of the
controversies. The current discussion of the actual
conduct of deliberative engagement is therefore not
a meta-perspective that will result in a recipe of
‘successful engagement’. Rather, it is a summary of
the important themes and points of conflict which
have been revealed by the various case studies. Our
observations cluster around three issues: the
exercising body and its relation to government, the
framing of the issues for deliberation, and the
specific procedures followed in deliberative exercises.
Regarding the exercising body, it is important to
emphasise the influence of the specific situations in
which public engagement in scientific governance is
introduced. Government-induced deliberative
exercises present a continuum between a situation in
which they are employed as a means of trying to
soften or avoid agonistic stalemate in a situation of
explicit controversy (as the debates about GM in The
Netherlands and UK demonstrate) or as a way of
dealing with anticipated, but more implicit conflicts in a
governance structure which is primarily corporatist
or discretionary (as we have found in Sweden and
Horst et al. European Scientific Governance in a Global Context: Resonances, Implications and Reflections14
Finland). Meanwhile, non-governmental actors may
mobilise voices of agonistic resistance and organise
deliberations themselves in situations in which no
active public participation is introduced by the
government or attempts to do so are perceived as
manipulative and one-sided. Each of these situations
poses very different challenges concerning the
relationship between participatory initiatives and
conventional policy institutions.
In situations of civil society action, the issue is quite
clearly whether, how and to what extent
government will make itself sensitive to participatory
engagement. As the Greek case studies
demonstrate, (sporadic) action on behalf of civil
society is very likely to be dismissed in order for
government to continue a predominantly
discretionary mode of governance (Botetzagias and
Boudourides 2004). In the Portuguese waste
handling case, however, it seems that non-
governmental organisation of participatory elements
had an impact on government action, although the
uptake was slow (Nunes and Matias 2004b).
In situations of government-induced or government-
led initiatives, the administrative question is how to
situate the participatory initiatives within the existing
policy-framework: should such initiatives be kept at
arm’s length from government or more fully
integrated? The arm’s length conduct of participatory
initiatives is relatively common – with a semi-
independent agency (e.g. the Danish Board of
Technology, the Norwegian Board of Biotechnology
or the UK Agriculture and Environment
Biotechnology Commission) charged with
conducting initiatives at a distance from government.
From a governmental perspective, such a structure
allows a very visible independence and autonomy for
deliberative initiatives. This relationship can, however,
leave the agencies in question vulnerable to political
change – and might create a situation where they
are seen as an optional extra to the policy process
rather than a central feature.
A vital aspect of any participatory process is the
actual framing of the debate, i.e. deciding which
questions to ask, what sources of evidence are
necessary, how the key issues are to be defined. The
chosen framing is especially important when the
issues dealt with can be encapsulated in a variety of
ways: is the nuclear power debate in Sweden about
the science and technology of radioactive waste
disposal or the maintenance and encouragement of
the larger nuclear fuel cycle (including military uses)
(Sundqvist 2004)? Was the central question in the
UK GM Nation? Debate about specific forms of GM
agriculture or the future of British farming? In
specific exercises, the framing of the debate
frequently seems to suggest a separation of ethical,
political, scientific and legal issues, but in actual
deliberation these aspects are often highly
intermingled. It is therefore regularly the case that
the separation itself will entail implicit decisions,
which prioritise certain questions over others and
define the issues in particular ways.
It is also important for those sponsoring deliberative
initiatives to take a broader look at the kinds of
evidence that will be considered relevant and
important. There is still a tendency to see public
groups as contributing only to ethical and political
discussions rather than having legitimate evidence
and forms of knowledge to offer. Strict separations
of ‘public’ and ‘scientific’ review can also mean that
legitimate questions (e.g. about the need for
particular innovations) do not get fully addressed.
With regard to the specific procedures followed in
the deliberative exercises, they have to be seen as
equitable and open. This suggests that all relevant
parties have to be able to participate in procedures
which are perceived to be without unfair restrictions.
This, however, is clearly an ideal formulation and
procedures are continuously contested in the
concrete cases: which are the relevant (or
‘legitimate’) parties, and what should count as unfair
restrictions? With regard to the relevant actors,
‘exclusion by composition’ (Pellizzoni, quoted in
Nunes and Matias 2004a) seems to be a common
theme within the case studies, although it takes
different forms. In the Portuguese case study about
regulation of reproductive technologies it appears as
obvious that several relevant stakeholders from the
public were excluded from participation by the
design of the policy process (Nunes and Matias
2004a). In other cases, however, we find different
ways of excluding actors. In the British and Dutch
GM debates, there was an explicit wish to engage
with ‘neutral’ citizens rather than stakeholder groups
with strong viewpoints (Healey 2004; Hagendijk and
Egmond 2004). It should be clear that this is also a
form of exclusion by composition, since it was
explicitly argued that these stakeholder groups
would distort the process of public deliberation. In
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actual deliberative exercises it is probably impossible
to create a design which no actor will find excluding,
but the important challenge must be to be as
inclusionary as possible within a given formulated
purpose. The Danish consensus conferences can be
seen as a good example of this as they are perceived
as having a high degree of legitimacy regarding their
procedures.
On a general level, there seems to be a tension
between efficiency and legitimacy in the design of
participatory procedures. Deliberative exercises need
to be steered, but this steering can be overdone with
a consequential loss of credibility. In many of our
cases, considerable effort was needed to keep the
initiative on-track and alive. As with the Dutch GM
discussion, debates are not always successful and it
would be useful to conduct further research into the
circumstances surrounding success and failure. We
would suggest, however, that it is not enough simply
to look at the specific design of the participatory
procedures. The framing of the issues and the
relation between deliberative exercises and
conventional policy institutions are equally important
for the relative success of deliberative engagement.
3.3 The outcome of deliberative engagement
In general, it is difficult to identify a clear pattern of
convergence with regard to the relation between
policy formulation and actual participatory outcome.
However, the identification of a directly causal
relationship between deliberative ‘output’ and policy
change is less straightforward than it is often
presented: we are typically dealing with complex
multi-variable situations where it is often hard to
identify a single ‘cause’ of policy change. Rather, we
should see the relation as one of mutual shaping and
policy evolution. The central focus behind the
following observations is therefore to identify and
discuss possible influences on scientific governance
brought about by deliberative experiments.
Despite the fact that direct influence on policy
formulation is difficult to demonstrate, the cases do
suggest that the introduction of deliberative
engagement will have effects on scientific
governance: at least, because it changes the character
(and often the content) of debate and policymaking.
The cases suggest that the introduction of various
forms of participative exercises shape expectations
towards greater inclusion of stakeholders. They also
make the framing of problems as well as the
organisational structure of policymaking appear as
prominent issues. These changes in expectations and
attentions, however, do not necessarily make policy
formulation any easier – in fact quite the opposite.
Deliberative engagement is therefore not a shortcut
to the creation of social consensus.
We regard this observation as a central one. In many
of our cases, there was quite clearly a governmental
desire to achieve social consensus through
deliberation with the further aim of regaining public
trust. In fact, this view that greater engagement is a
route to rebuilding public trust appears to be
widespread across Europe. But the view that the
deliberative mode can in itself (i.e. without wider
institutional change) settle public concerns about the
direction and form of sociotechnical change is not
supported by our cases. Instead, it could be suggested
that rhetorical statements about the need for
deliberation which do not also consider the full
institutional implications of this mode are likely to
lead to alienation and increased scepticism.
Stakeholders experiencing lack of support for their
views have a tendency to use accusations of a
hijacked debate as a means of rejecting the exercise.
In this way, deliberative exercises can have the effect
of making antagonisms even more pronounced
(which can be considered as both a negative and a
positive impact).
In all circumstances, the case studies suggest that
deliberation can be as much a source of conflict as a
means to reach a solution. How should we interpret
this? It might be concluded from the above that the
ideal of deliberation is too contested, contextually
sensitive and flexible to be of any intellectual or
policy value. Certainly, our cases have identified:
z A partiality within the conduct of deliberation
across Europe: only particular (generally high
profile) issues have been selected for deliberative
discussion, but in the overall picture, these
initiatives tend to be rather small-scale and
marginal.
z A conflictuality within the cases: despite the
enthusiasm among government bodies for
deliberation as a means of consensus generation,
we find considerable areas of dissent and
disagreement in each of the specific contexts –
also after the deliberative exercises took place.
z A fragility to these initiatives: deliberative
processes have not become embedded in
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government but often appear to be at the point
of termination. For example, both the Danish
Board of Technology and the UK Agriculture and
Environment Biotechnology Commission have
been under threat at different points during our
project (with the latter ultimately being disbanded
in 2005).
The interpretation of these points as a defeat for
deliberative ideals, however, depends on the relative
weight placed on consensus and institutionalisation.
We propose that neither of them should be
regarded as crucial for the deliberative agenda.
Consensus may not necessarily be a desirable (let
alone achievable) policy objective. And
institutionalisation of a deliberative agenda might
render the process bureaucratic and instrumental,
thereby removing the political vitality from the
initiatives. Rather than viewing these three
characteristics as flaws (or as problems to be solved),
they could be perceived as necessary incoherences
and loci of vitality in the deliberative experiments.
Following this argument, the antagonistic elements,
the confusion between the different modes and the
constant threat of collapse represent a central part
of keeping participatory exercises alive. These
challenges might be the very same characteristics
that give participatory exercises their capacity to
invoke (and provoke) change – although the
promises of deliberation might never be fulfilled as
such. These partial, conflictual and fragile tendencies
however, need to be balanced with a policy-
framework which is open to the issues raised,
flexible in the face of competing assessments, and
committed to taking the outcomes of deliberative
exercises seriously.
Our general argument is that there is a distinct
character – or at least common characteristics – to
current European debates over scientific governance,
and the infusion of deliberative ideals is a central part
of this character. This conclusion, of course, does not
suggest that this character is only a European
phenomenon. At a specific level, each of the cases –
and indeed each of the nations studied – has its own
distinctiveness. We are not trying to blur or deny
significant differences between the countries and
contexts under discussion here. Instead, our
argument is that Europe represents a characteristic
fusion (or, more accurately, uneasy mix) of
governance styles.
4 European scientific governance in a global
context
The STAGE project was very much a European study
– and one based on ‘only’ eight countries, with a
particular emphasis on richer Western nations rather
than the new accession countries of the East.
Despite this, strong patterns of diversity as well as
congruence were identified. Our empirical
experience was certainly not of a homogeneous
bloc, but rather of a dynamic and contested range of
discussions with some common themes as discussed
above. While certain forms of political and
development theory speak in sweeping
generalisations of globalisation, knowledge societies
and the developed/developing worlds, our
experience was of shifting contextualities,
competing agenda and changing political cultures.
Denmark – often presented internationally as the
home of consensus formation and societal inclusion
– has more recently become the locus for worldwide
and divisive debates over immigration, cultural
difference and the nature of free speech. Finland
meanwhile has been undergoing tremendous
economic and industrial change as it emerges as a
global centre of technological innovation and
development. Of course, governments change and
political cultures have deeper roots, but we were
constantly reminded of the dangers of drawing easy
conclusions about national and international
experience – and in particular of pinning down
national systems of governance to unitary
categorisation (a tendency to which cross-European
studies are particularly drawn).
Our typology of styles of governance and public
engagement allowed us to explore differences as
well as points of convergence and its application
documented that it would be a misguided
simplification to speak of a new European approach
in the singular, despite signs of convergence, mutual
learning and mimicking. Going further, it would be
interesting to see whether experiences with public
engagement in other parts of the world can be
made sense of using this heuristic scheme. What in
turn would this imply for more general debates
about politics, science and democratic theory? As
has already been suggested (Gaventa 2006), debates
about deepening democracy seem to vary around
the world depending upon the specific political and
socioeconomic conditions and experiences. Does this
also hold for public engagement with science and
technology in such diverse contexts?
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As pointed out above, the deliberative mode is of
special importance in the STAGE project as well as in
European debates about scientific and technological
innovation. On the basis of our work, we conclude
that it is important not to be taken in too easily by
the almost universal endorsement of public
participation and deliberation. Such terms mean
different things to different people. As we hope to
have shown, various aims may be associated with
public participation and deliberation. The issues may
be framed quite differently with very different
agenda. The design and actual running of exercises
can also vary substantially. In this respect, it is
important not to dismiss conflicts and debates about
the genuine or manipulative character of specific
initiatives as disrupting the debate about the ‘real’
questions. Such diversions should be seen as part and
parcel of the processes in which we are interested.
Over the last couple of years, there have been quite a
number of exercises to identify best practices in public
engagement and various recipe books and reports
have been published. Such attempts are no doubt
helpful but on the basis of our work we conclude that
they will remain limited as they are unavoidably over-
focused on procedural issues and characteristically
ignore two key issues. First, such attempts tend to
ignore how the fate of initiatives depends on the
contested framings of the issues at stake by real and
envisaged participants. Second, their relation to and
embedding in established form of politics and
policymaking in the respective country is crucial for
their effectiveness. Looking back at the European
experience so far, the partiality, conflictuality, and
fragility of attempts to democratise innovation and
technological change stand in disconcerting relation to
the almost universal endorsement of deliberative
ideals at the ideological level.
Speculating more widely beyond our cases, a number
of further issues seem relevant from a global
perspective. In the first place, systems of scientific
governance both reflect wider political cultures (a
point we have already emphasised) but also
represent important forms of nation-building and
repositioning. This is especially clear within the
European rhetoric of the Lisbon agenda which, while
clearly prioritising the familiar economic objectives of
competitiveness, productivity and growth also
incorporates social objectives such as the quality of
life and of jobs, sustainability and social cohesion.
These broader repositionings, however rhetorical, are
at least a reference point for the more detailed
politics of individual exercises of public participation.
Furthermore, they can be seen to carry through into
the international policy of European states. Thus,
during his period of office, Tony Blair’s domestic
vision of a successful Britain was tied up both with
internationally competitive, science-led progress but
also the need to gain public support and trust. In
parallel, the UK Department for International
Development policy (DFID 2005) emphasised the
importance of research on governance in relation to
development, and supported continuing research ‘on
how citizens can develop the ability to participate …
and how [they] can hold states accountable …’.
As the previously considered ‘developing’ nations
(Payne 2005) move forward with their own visions of
science-led social change, it will be important to
consider the systems of governance, and the scope
and mechanisms of participation and accountability in
particular, which emerge alongside and underpin these
visions. Taking this further, it will be an important issue
of how the agenda of innovation, democratisation and
accountability develop and intervene within each
other. Participation may lift up situated knowledge and
give it a voice in the political process, as Cozzens et al.
have pointed out (2007). Yet, situations of antagonism
between these agendas are also certainly possible,
accentuating the boundary between deliberative,
corporatist and agonistic forms of development and
governance. Mutual invigoration (e.g. through such
concepts as ‘user-driven innovation’) is perhaps the
best outcome one may expect.
Second, discussions over scientific governance within
Europe seem especially important to broader debates
over the relationship between science, technology and
democracy. While experience so far of engagement is
certainly open to criticism as being ‘something of a
mirage’ (Wynne 2005: 68), this conclusion should not
conceal the questions and challenges which are
actively at play within apparently modest ‘social
experiments’. Among these, we would identify: the
relationship between societal assessments and the
innovation process, the most appropriate forms of
‘democratisation’ for particular contexts (one size
indeed does not fit all), the relationship between local
initiatives and national/international political systems,
and competing models of citizenship. Going further,
we would suggest that experience in this area raises
questions also of the responsiveness and accountability
of scientific institutions to wider society. This is not
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simply a question of encouraging greater institutional
openness but also of addressing the very frameworks
in which issues are currently being framed and
presented to the wider publics.
Third, and very importantly, the emphasis in this
article has implicitly been on what the rest of the
world can learn from European experience – an
emphasis put forward with appropriate empirical
humility but which is nevertheless undeniable.
Discussion of ‘Europe in a global context’ must also
consider how the nations of Europe can benefit
from international experience and draw from other
cultural and political traditions. This point is made all
the more important by the recent expansion of the
EU to include nations with very diverse economic
and political foundations. Certainly, the notion that
the richer countries of Europe represent an
appropriate example in this area, is open to
substantial dispute. At a time when the old
categorisations of the ‘developed’ and ‘developing’
worlds are collapsing, the nations of Europe must
look outside as well as inside their boundaries for
democratic imagination and societal reappraisal.
IDS Bulletin Volume 38  Number 5  November 2007 19
Note
* The authors would like to thank colleagues in the
STAGE network as well as the EU Commission
for financial support to the STAGE network
(contract no. HPSE–CT2001–50003).
Corresponding author: Maja Horst, Department
of Management, Politics and Philosophy,
Copenhagen Business School, Porcelaenshaven
18A, DK-2000 Frederiksberg C, Denmark,
mh.lpf@cbs.dk.
1 All STAGE Discussion Papers are available at:
www.stage-research.net
References
Bertilsson, Margareta (2004) Governance of Science
and Technology: The Case of Denmark, STAGE
Discussion Paper 31, Copenhagen: University of
Copenhagen
Blok, A. (2007) ‘Experts on Public Trial: On
Democratizing Expertise through a Danish
Consensus Conference’, Public Understanding of
Science 16.2: 163–82
Botetzagias, I. and Boudourides, M.A. (2004)
Environmental Organisations in Greece, STAGE
Discussion Paper 8, Patras: University of Patras
Botetzagias, Iosif A.; Boudourides, Moses A. and
Kalamaras, Dimitris B. (2004a) ICTs in Greece,
STAGE Discussion Paper 18, University of Patras
Botetzagias, Iosif A.; Boudourides, Moses A. and
Kalamaras, Dimitris B. (2004b) Biotechnology in
Greece, STAGE Discussion Paper 10, University of
Patras
Commission of the European Communities (CEC)
(2002) Science and Society: Action Plan, Brussels:
European Communities
Cozzens, S.; Hagendijk, R.; Healey, P. and Santos
Pereira, T. (2007) A Framework for Analyzing
Science, Technology and Inequalities: Preliminary
Observations, James Martin Institute Working
Paper 3, Oxford: James Martin Institute,
University of Oxford
Department for International Development (DFID)
(2005) DFID Research Funding Framework
2005–2007, www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/
researchframework/research-framework-2005.pdf
(accessed 3 July 2007)
Elam, Mark (2004) Democracy at Stake: Film,
Folkbildning and Public Engagement With
Biotechnology in Sweden, STAGE Discussion Paper
24, Gothenburg: Gothenburg University
Elam, M. and Bertilsson, M. (2003) ‘Consuming,
Engaging and Confronting Science: The Emerging
Dimensions of Scientific Citizenship’, European
Journal of Social Theory 6.2: 233–51
Elam, M. and Glimell, H. (2004) Knowledge Society as
the Republic of Science Enlarged: The Case of
Sweden, STAGE Discussion Paper 26,
Gothenburg: Gothenburg University
Gaventa, J. (2006) Triumph, Deficit or Contestation:
Deepening the ‘Deepening Democracy’ Debate, IDS
Working Paper 264, Brighton: IDS
GM Nation? (2003) The Findings of the Public Debate,
www.gmnation.org.uk (accessed 3 July 2007)
Glimell, Hans (2004) Restored Scientific Authority and
Orchestrated Deliberation: A Review of the Current
Swedish S&T Policies, STAGE Discussion Paper 27,
Gothenburg: Gothenburg University
Hagendijk, R.P. (2004) ‘The Public Understanding of
Science and Public Participation in Regulated
Worlds’, Minerva 42: 41–59
Hagendijk, R.P. and Egmond, M. (2004) The GM Food
Debate in The Netherlands: 1999–2002, STAGE
Discussion Paper 14, Amsterdam: University of
Amsterdam
Hagendijk, R.P. and Irwin, A. (2006) ‘Public
Deliberation and Governance: Engaging with
Science and Technology in Contemporary
Europe’, Minerva 44.2: 167–84
Hagendijk, R.P. and Kallerud, E. (2003) Changing
Conceptions and Practices of Governance in Science
and Technology in Europe: A Framework for
Analysis, STAGE Discussion Paper 2, Amsterdam:
University of Amsterdam
Hagendijk, R.P. and Terpstra, A. (2004) Technology,
Risk and Democracy: The Dutch Nuclear Energy
Debate (1981–1984), STAGE Discussion Paper 12,
Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam
Hagendijk, R.P.; Healey, P.; Horst, M. and Irwin, A.
(2005) Science, Technology and Governance in
Europe, final report on the STAGE project
Häyrinen-Alestalo, M.; Pelkonen, A. and Snell, K.
(2004) New Technologies Challenging Old Structures
of Governance, STAGE Discussion Paper 7,
Helsinki: University of Helsinki
Häyrinen-Alestalo, Marja and Snell, Karoliina (2004)
Market Orientations and Mediation of Public
Opinions in Finnish Biotechnology, STAGE
Discussion Paper 6, Helsinki: University of Helsinki
Healey, P. (2004) The 2003 UK GM Crops Debate,
STAGE Discussion Paper 28, Oxford: James
Martin Institute, University of Oxford
Horst, M. (2007) ‘Public Expectations of Gene
Therapy: Scientific Futures and the Performative
Effects on Scientific Citizenship’, Science,
Technology and Human Values 32.2: 150–71
Horst, M. (2005) ‘Cloning Sensations: Mass Mediated
Articulation of Social Responses to Controversial
Biotechnology’, Public Understanding of Science 14:
185–200
Horst, M. (2003) ‘Controversy and Collectivity:
Articulations of Social and Natural Order in Mass
Mediated Representations of Biotechnology’,
doctoral thesis, Copenhagen Business School,
Denmark
Irwin, A. (2006) ‘The Politics of Talk: Coming to
Terms with the ‘New’ Scientific Governance’,
Social Studies of Science 36.2: 299–320
Irwin, A. (2001) ‘Constructing the Scientific Citizen:
Science and Democracy in the Biosciences’, Public
Understanding of Science 10.1: 1–18
Irwin, A. (1995) Citizen Science, London: Routledge
Jasanoff, S. (2005) Designs on Nature, Princeton:
Princeton University Press
Jensen, C.B. (2004) Citizen Projects and Consensus
Building at the Danish Board of Technology: On
Experiments in Democracy, STAGE Discussion
Paper 4, Aarhus: Aarhus University
Kallerud, E. (2004a) Controversy Over Institutional
Structure and Design in Norwegian Governance of
Science and Technology, STAGE Discussion
Paper 16, Oslo: NIFU STEP
Kallerud, E. (2004b) Science, Technology and
Governance in Norway, STAGE Discussion Paper
19, Oslo: NIFU STEP
Lassen, Jesper (2004) Changing Modes of
Biotechnology Governance in Denmark, STAGE
Discussion Paper 3, Copenhagen: Royal Veterinary
and Agricultural University
Nunes, J.A. and Matias, M. (2004a) A Regulatory
Void? Reprogenetics in Portugal, STAGE Discussion
Paper 20, Coimbra: University of Coimbra
Nunes, J.A. and Matias, M. (2004b) Agonistic Spaces,
Consensus Politics and the Trials of Governance:
Environmental Policies and Conflict in Portugal,
STAGE Discussion Paper 21, Coimbra: University
of Coimbra
Nunes, J.A and Matias, M. (2004) Science, Technology
and Governance in Portugal, STAGE Discussion
Paper 22, Coimbra: University of Coimbra
Nunes, J.A.; Pereira, T.S. and Matias, M. (2004) The
BSE Crisis in Portugal or How to ‘Domesticate’
European Regulatory Policies, STAGE Discussion
Paper 23, Coimbra: University of Coimbra
Payne, A. (2005) The Global Politics of Unequal
Development, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan
Pelkonen, Antti (2004) Questioning the Finnish Model
– Forms of Public Engagement in Building the Finnish
Information Society, STAGE Discussion Paper 5,
Helsinki: University of Helsinki
Rothstein, H.; Irwin, A.; Yearley, S. and McCarthy, E.
(1999) ‘Regulatory Science, Europeanisation and
the Control of Agrochemicals’, Science,
Technology and Human Values 24.2: 241–64
Stilgoe, J.; Irwin, A. and Jones, K. (2006) The
Received Wisdom: Opening Up Expert Advice,
London: Demos
Sundqvist, G. (2004) Constrained Deliberation: Public
Involvement in Swedish Nuclear Waste Management,
STAGE Discussion Paper 25, Gothenburg:
Gothenburg University
Wouters, Paul (2004) ‘It Can’t be Uninvented’ – The
Dutch Debate About the Chip in the Early 1980s,
STAGE Discussion Paper 13, Amsterdam: Royal
Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences
Wynne, B. (2005) ‘Risk as Globalizing Discourse?
Framing Subjects and Citizens’, in M. Leach,
I. Scoones and B. Wynne (eds) Science and Citizens:
Globalization and the Challenge of Engagement,
London: Zed Books
Horst et al. European Scientific Governance in a Global Context: Resonances, Implications and Reflections20
